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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the most visible political phenomena during Indonesia’s 2009 Legislative 
Assembly Election was the promulgation of the candidates’ ideology through billboards as 
a new cultural artefact. During the campaign, streets all over Indonesia were dotted with 
the candidates’ billboards as  the result of the amended law of Legislative Election. The 
law stipulates that the candidates are now obliged to present themselves directly to the 
public for the first time. The billboard represents the convoluted web of representation 
which shows the complexity of polarisations between Nationalist and Islamist strands in 
the political discursive practices of the major parties. The paper deciphers how the 
Nationalist and Islamist strands’ images were constructed, constested and obscured on the 
billboards. Nine billboards that represent the nine winning parties (five nationalist and 
four Islamist) are examined to disentangle the complexity of the politics of image in 
Indonesia. 
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REPRESENTATION AND SYMBOLIC POLITICS IN INDONESIA: BILLBOARD ADVERTISING IN 
THE 2009 LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the downfall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, the Indonesian political arena has experienced 
marked political resilience. Mietzner and Aspinall argue that Indonesia’s success in transforming its democratic 
system from guided democracy (Soekarno’s era), through authoritarian rule (Soeharto’s era or New Order 
regime) to electoral democracy (the Reform era) marks the rise of democratic politics in the post-New Order 
period.2 Indonesia’s democratic performance steadily improved after the 1997 Asian Financial crisis, with 
commentators noting a significant improvement regarding Indonesia’s score on its political rights and civil 
liberties, especially during 2006-2009.3 In the measurements of democratic freedoms published by Freedom 
House, a U. S.-based N. G. O. that monitors and advocates democracy and human rights around the world, 
Indonesia’s achievements and rating in 2008 (2.3 on a sliding scale on which 1 is the highest degree of freedom) 
far out-stripped neighbouring countries such as Philippines (4.3) and Thailand (6.4).  
 
This outstanding result arguably stems from Indonesia’s success in rectifying its democratic system especially in 
the Reform era (1998-now). Habibie’s government (1998-1999) was noted for ‘peacefully’ turning this 
transition era away from the authoritarian rule to the democratic system that paved the way for ‘freer’ 
democratic elections by employing the combination of district and proportional systems. The baton was then 
given to Megawati after the elected President, Abdurrahman Wahid, was impeached due to allegations regarding 
financial scandals. Megawati’s administration (2001-2004) successfully initiated a direct Presidential election 
into Indonesia’s history. However, prior to the Presidential election, the parliamentary election conducted by her 
government that employed a new election system called an open-list system,4 reinforced the party’s oligarchy. 
Haris argues that this system positions the parties as the determiners that organise the positions of their cadres 
into the list of a ranking number on the ballot papers.5 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) government 
annulled this system. In 2009 the Constitutional Court acceded a judicial review of Law no. 10, 2008, article 
214 which stipulated that the decision to determine the elected legislative candidates based on the ranking 
number on the ballot paper (as in the 2004 Legislative Election) was against the 1945 Constitution. This 
imposed a necessity for the legislative candidates to present themselves directly to the public for the first time. It 
also led to the construction of a new political culture that heavily relies on the politics of image in Indonesia, 
constructing through many mediums, including the billboard.  
 
The political billboard itself represents the intricate web of representation which involves the complexity of 
historical polarisation of Nationalist and Islamist strands within the major parties. Kingsbury argues that this 
polarisation, which originated from Javanese culture, defines Indonesian religious characteristics,6 especially the 
Muslim one.7 Geertz’s classifies Javanese religious groups into three: abangan, santri  and priyayi. He defines 
                                               
1
 The paper is part of my dissertation project currently in progress. I greatly appreciate the comments and inputs 
made on this paper by Rod Giblett, Christopher Crouch and Dennis Wood as my supervisors, and by the editors 
of the Crossroads journal. As this paper was presented at the Perspective on Power Conference held at 
University of Queensland on 23-25 November 2011, I would also like to thank Diyantari for her contribution as 
my co-presenter. 
2
 Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall, “Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: an Overview” in 
Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia Elections, Institutions and Society, Edward Aspinall and Marcus 
Mietzner (Eds.) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 1-20: 1-5. 
3
 Larry Diamond, “Indonesia’s Place in Global Democracy” in Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia 
Elections, Institutions and Society, Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (Eds.) (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 21-49: 30-32. 
4
 A system that allowed the voters to directly read the names of the legislative candidates on the ballot paper 
prior to their casting a vote. 
5
 Syamsuddin Haris, Pemilu Langsung di Tengah Oligarki Partai Proses Nominasi dan Seleksi Calon Legislatif 
Pemilu 2004, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama dan Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia dan Netherlands 
Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2005). 
6
 Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 3rd Edition (Victoria: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
7
 Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia; Greg Fealy, “Foreword” in Islamism in Indonesia Politics in the 
Emerging Democracy by Bernhard Platzdasch (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), xi-xiv: 
xii; Saiful Mujani, and. R. William Liddle, “Voters and the New Indonesian Democracy” in Problems of 
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abangan as the group who strongly holds Javanese animistic elements and seldom performs any religious formal 
practices whilst santri as comprise the devout Muslims who are mostly traders.8 One of the abangan variants, 
abangan Muslim or syncretic Muslim, usually consists of the peasants who live in the rural areas. However, 
many scholars disagree with Geertz’s classification for not only does priyayi denote a social group (Javanese 
aristocracy class),9 not a religious group, but also Geertz overlooks the classification by focusing merely on the 
conventional anthropological polarisation (big tradition/small tradition or the ‘pure’ Islam/Javanese Islam) as his 
theoretical basis and treats the phenomena merely within the socio-cultural context which is plausibly detached 
from the Islamic scriptures. Kingsbury argues that aside from this stark distinction between abangan and santri 
which lies on their level of acceptability of Javanese animistic belief,10 this accommodating act can arguably be 
seen as the capacity of Indonesian Islam to adopt the local culture. Pranowo argues that this acceptability 
defines discrepant characteristics of santri and abangan Muslim: being a Muslim is not merely about the state of 
being (that A is a Muslim and B is the nominal Muslim) but more to do with the religious state of becoming 
(although B is reluctant to practise the Muslim’s five-time prayer, B will one day fulfil that religious obligation 
and support all socio-cultural practices in developing Islam).11  
 
In the context of Islamist politics development in Indonesia, the notion of santri develops into the Islamic 
faction whereas abangan becomes the nationalist faction. The transformation itself is not rigid. The santri 
sphere then splits into Islamist and nationalist in the second quarter of the twentieth century.12 The abangan 
transforms itself as religiously neutral nationalist,13 or secular nationalist.14 The notion santri then proliferates in 
accordance with the development of the socio-historical context in Indonesia: from radical,15 or 
fundamentalist,16  or idealist,17 through traditionalist,18 and modernist,19 to neo modernist.20 Hefner argues that 
the polarised notions can be seen in two general perspectives: civil Islam (the Muslims who promote the 
concepts of democracy, pluralism, freedom and civil rights) and the opposite group, regimist Islam, which was 
arguably invented by Soeharto’s regime (which was anti-democracy, repressive, and authoritarian).21 
 
This paper outlines the mechanism of how the candidates’ billboards represent the images of Nationalist and 
Islamist polarisation. I argue that the signifying practices of the image construction on the billboards not only 
show the contestation of these two strands but that they also obscure the polarisation itself. The paper is 
organised by looking at the Indonesian political realm (concentrating on the Nationalist and Islamist cleavage), 
                                                                                                                                                  
Democratisation in Indonesia Elections, Institutions and Society, Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (Eds) 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010). 
8
 Clifford Geertz, Religion of Java (Clencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960). 
9
 M. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974); Koentjaraningrat, 
Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Indonesia and Malaysia (California: Cummings, 1975); 
Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); M. Nakamura, “The Cultural and 
Religious Identity of Javanese Muslims: Problems of Conceptualization and Approach,” Prisma 31 (1984); A. 
Gaffar, Javanese Voters (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992); Leo Suryadinata, Elections and 
Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002); Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam and the 
Secular State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009); Azyumardi Azra, “Foreword: 
Santri-Abangan Revisited” in Memahami Islam Jawa [Understanding Javanese Islam] by M. B. Pranowo 
(Tangerang: Pustaka Alvabet and Institute for Society Empowerment, 2009), i-xii; M. B. Pranowo, Memahami 
Islam Jawa (Tangerang: Pustaka Alvabet and Institute for Society Empowerment, 2009).  
10
 Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 28. 
11
 Pranowo, Memahami Islam Jawa. 
12
 Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia, 42. 
13
 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1990 – 1942 (Singapore, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973). 
14
 E. S. Anshari, Piagam Jakarta, 22 Juni 1945 dan Sejarah Konsensus Nasional antara NasionalisIslam dan 
Nasionalis Sekular tentang Dasar Negara RI, 1945 – 1959 (Bandung: Pustaka PerpustakaanSalman ITB, 1981). 
15
 Fealy, “Foreword,” xii. 
16
 A. Samson, Islam and Politics in Indonesia (University of California, 1972). Forthcoming. 
17
 M. K. Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order” Modernization in Indonesia, (Kuala Lumpur: 
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1980). 
18
 Fealy, “Foreword,” xii. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 R. M. Woodward, “Indonesia, Islam, and the Prospect for Democracy,” SAIS Review 21:2 (2001): 29-37: 35-
36. 
21
 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
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the political branding (such as the slogan, the party’s platforms, and Pancasila - the state ideology), and a 
reading of the candidates’ billboards as cultural and visual artefacts that express a visual narratives. I limit the 
analysis by examining the billboards of nine political parties that won seats in the 2009 Legislative Election, not 
focusing on how the spectators responded to the billboards, but on how the billboards narrate the polarisation 
and contest between the two dominant political camps.    
 
INDONESIAN POLITICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The polarisation of Nationalist and Islamist strands within the major parties, especially since the time Indonesia 
gained her independence, has defined the Indonesian political framework. Fealy argues that although this 
factional polarisation no longer gains ‘academic accuracy’ in the present day,22 it remains the dominant 
ideological marker to map the Indonesian political framework. Sukma and Platzdasch argue that the status of 
accuracy has been detached since each faction attempts to adopt the ideological values of its adversary which 
obscures the ideological framework of the factions.23At the same time, this obscurity validates the basis of 
investigating the contestation between the Nationalist and Islamist strands that are reflected in the billboards of 
their legislative candidates. This section analyses the contention between Nationalist and Islamic camps that 
illuminates their political branding. 
 
The overt ideological contestation in the 1920s to 1960s stemmed from the perennial disputes between Islamist 
and Nationalist camps over state ideology. The Islamist faction wanted to stick with the initial proposition to 
include the phrase ‘with the obligation to live according to Islamic law for the Muslims’ in the first principle of 
Pancasila of the Jakarta charter.24 Platzdasch notes that the act of effacing this phrase was seen by the Islamist 
faction as violating Pancasila’s democratic principle of musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus).25 
The Islamic faction argued that the members, who drafted the charter (the Investigatory Body for the 
Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI), which comprised secular nationalists, Muslims, Christians, 
Javanese and non Javanese elements, was regarded as representational. Due to this, the charter was perceived as 
representing a political compromise, especially between the two dominant camps. However, although Mashad 
notes that the Islamist faction eventually agreed not to amend it as they realised that it was too early to urge such 
notion as Indonesia had only recently gained her independence,26 this, as Platzdasch further argues, fostered 
‘cross-religious suspicion’ which ‘echoes the intrinsic position of shari’ah (Islamic law)-minded Muslims in 
early to mid twentieth centuries.’27  
 
This shari’ah-minded-ness ostensibly ran parallel with the pan-Islamism propagated by Indian-Paskitani Abu al-
A’la al Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. It found its channel in Indonesian polity in the mid-twentieth century through 
an Islamist party, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or Consultative Council of Indonesian 
Muslims), led by Mohammad Natsir. However, Platzdasch  argues that the amalgamation of Islamic values with 
the western concept of democracy distanced Masyumi from pan-Islamism.28 He found that Masyumi believed in 
the compatibility of Islam with the western democratic concept by coalescing the Paskitani ‘Islamic republic’ 
model with the ‘democratic and constitutional based state’ which placed the state as the core institution to 
uphold Islamic law (shari’ah). 
 
Due to an allegation of mutiny made against Masyumi, Soekarno issued the Presidential Decree no 200/1960 
that dissolved the party in 1960. Notwithstanding his suppression of this largest Islamist party, Soekarno 
                                               
22
 Greg Fealy, “Foreword,” xii. 
23
 Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Defective System, Resilient Democracy” in Problems of 
Democratisation in Indonesia Elections, Institutions and Society, E. Aspinall and M. Mietzner (Eds) (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 65; Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia, (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). 
24
 The Jakarta Charter, which was signed in Jakarta on 22 June 1945, was the first design of the state philosophy 
that the members of the Investigatory Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) produced 
prior to Indonesia’s Independence on 17 August 1945. Mashad (Dhurorudin Mashad, Akar Konflik Politik Islam 
di Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2008), 57)), notes that Soekarno, the member of BPUPKI who  later 
the first President of Indonesia, perceived the charter as a political compromise between the Nationalist and 
Islamist camps, not to make Islam as the state ideology which would turn the country into an Islamic one, but 
rather as the result of the modus vivendi that bridged the deadlock between the two camps.  
25
 Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia, 124-125. 
26
 Mashad, Akar Konflik. 
27
 Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia, 14, 125. 
28
 Ibid., 30-32. 
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attempted to synthesise the nationalist, Islamists, and communists under one concept NASAKOM (Nationalist, 
Religion, and Communist) to perpetuate his status quo.  
 
However, the downfall of Soekarno’s regime due to the failed communist coup in 1965 marked a new hope for 
the Islamist faction to rehabilitate its name.29 History records a different reality. Instead of rehabilitating the 
Islamist faction’s name, Soeharto’s administration emasculated the polarisation of Nationalist and Islamist 
strands under the slogan of developmentalism. People’s freedom to actively participate in politics was 
circumscribed by Soeharto’s regime for it was perceived as the source of separatist movement and political 
turmoil. The President deployed Golkar (the functional group) as his electoral machine and imposed Pancasila 
as the sole ideology for all political parties. He held the same ideological belief as Soekarno that Pancasila, 
which reflected the Indonesian soul, could unite the people. The fusion of Pancasila and developmentalism 
muffled people’s opposition. The Islamist camp finally accepted Pancasila and perceived Pancasila’s first 
principle (Belief in One Almighty God) could accommodate the Islamist aspiration. This, as Kingsbury argues, 
is possibly due to the Islamist faction’s view that Pancasila’s secular (religious) notion is seen not as quite 
illegitimate,’ as it does not totally contradict the ‘Islam’s social and legal claim’ as previously discussed.30    
 
In the Reform era, the ideological contestation re-emerged during the Presidential election in 1999. PDI-P had to 
admit the Central Axis group’s (the Islamist faction) political manoeuvre in putting Abdurrahman Wahid as the 
President although PDI-P won the assembly election. However, the ideological contestation did not appear in 
the same form as in the period from 1945 to the1960s. It has been transformed and shifted into a pragmatic one 
due to the cartel system or the fluid coalition that attenuated the ideological contestation.31 
 
THE 2009 ASSEMBLY ELECTION 
 
The 2009 legislative assembly election was conducted on 9 April 2009 with the participation of 171 million 
people and 38 political parties. Only nine parties met the parliamentary threshold (2.5 per cent). They are as 
follows: 
 
PartaiDemokrat (PD - Democrat Party) 20.85% 
PartaiGolkar (Golkar - Functional Group Party) 14.45% 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P or Indonesian Democratic Party- Struggle) 14.03% 
PartaiKeadilanSejahtera (PKS – Prosperous Justice Party)    7.88% 
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN – National Mandate Party)    6.01% 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP – United Development Party)   5.32% 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB – Nation’s Awakening Party)     4.94% 
Partai Gerakan Indonesia Merdeka (Gerindra – Greater Indonesia Movement Party)   4.46% 
Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura – People’s Conscience Party)    3.77% 
 
The result shows that the total votes for the nationalist faction reached 57.56 per cent (PD, Golkar, PDI-P, 
Gerindra, and Hanura), escalating 21.03 per cent from the 2004 Assembly Election. The ratio between the 
nationalist faction (PD, Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra, and Hanura) and Islamist faction (PKS, PPP, PKB, PAN) 
means that if there are five persons voting for the Islamist parties then there will be 12 persons voting for the 
nationalists. However, we cannot infer that the phenomenon guaranteed the re-emergence of the overt 
ideological cleavage as in previous elections. The 2009 election was heavily engaged in exalting the politics of 
image. The polarisation between Islamist and Nationalist strands seemingly found a new channel to materialize 
especially in the image construction of the key party’s figures. The PPP Vice Secretary General, Romahurmuziy 
argued in Kompas that the politics of the (key) party’s figures was the far-reaching factor in winning the 
election.32 Papua and Sulawesi were the examples where religious based parties no longer became the 
determiner in voting. This was due to the culture of revering the local community figures. People would follow 
the party in which these figures were involved.33  
                                               
29
 Mahendra. Kebijakan Orde Baru, Masyumi dan Islam [New Order Policies, Masyumi and Islam]. 
http://yusril.ihzamahendra.com/2008/01/31/kebijakan-orde-baru-terhadap-masyumi-dan-islam/. Accessed 18 .6. 
2012 
30
 Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 86. 
31
 Kuskridho Ambardi, Mengungkap Politik Kartel Studi tentang Sistem Kepartaian di Indonesia Era Reformasi 
(Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia bekerjasama dengan Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2009). 
32
 Kompas, 30 April 2011.  
33
 Kompas, 27 February 2009; 15 March 2009. 
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THE PARTY’S BRANDING AND PANCASILA 
 
Research that specifically investigates the political branding of the old political parties (PPP, Golkar, PDI/PDIP) 
let alone the new ones (PD, PKS, PAN, PKB, Gerindra, and Hanura) via billboard is scarce. A few instances are 
found, such as: Signifikansi Iklan Politik dalam Pemilu 2004 (Analisis Semiotika Iklan PDI Perjuangan Dalam 
Kampanye Pemilu 2004) or the Significance of Political advertisement in 2004 General Election (a Semiotic 
Analysis of PDI-P in 2004 Campaigns), by M. Edy Susilo and Prayudi,34 offered semiotic reading of PDI-P’s 
political branding in newspapers during the 2004 General Election. They found that the ads did not offer 
sufficient understanding for the voters to choose PDI-P. They merely sold Megawati’s image as the woman who 
was believed to be inheriting Soekarno’s charisma. Ajidarma also offered a semiotic reading of the candidate’s 
billboards and found that they were merely about the morphology of the structure which represents the 
socio/language erosion of what is untold in the social world (in order to achieve the socio-moral status that co-
exists in the political arena).35 Firmanzah examined contestation, legitimacy and power in the 2009 Elections 
from the perspective of political marketing.36  
 
The works concerning ‘what’s-inside’ the political parties are also hard to find in the ‘market.’ Their availability 
is internally consumed for they are focused on doctrine which needs to be imposed on the political parties’ 
internal adherents. Lee-Marshment argued that branding is not about the overall perception but more about 
‘...the impressions, images, attitudes and recognition.’37 It thus made the party’s slogan and platforms become 
the core points in investigating how the party creates a feeling of identity as the differentiation factor in their 
political marketing. Below is the summary of the political party’s slogan and platforms adopted from Firmanzah  
that illuminates the party’s branding.38  
 
PARTY   SLOGAN    PLATFORMS 
PD   Continue!    Reducing poverty and the country’s debt 
 
GOLKAR   Giving Evidence not Promises,  Law supremacy, ekonomi kerakyatan,  
   The Sooner the Better   nationalism, pluralism 
 
PDIP   The Grassroots’ Party   Supervising BLT, people’s prosperity, 
cheap price of the staple foods, creating 
millions of jobs 
 
PKS   Caring, Clean, Professional  Clean governance 
 
PAN   Life is Action    ‘Education for free’ Program and 1.5 
trillion rupiah for underdeveloped 
villages 
 
PPP   Together Revive to Make a   Reinforcing UMKM, “education and 
Change     health services for free” programs, 
        the draft of Halal Assurance Law, 
         Custom and Tradition Law, and  
        Islamic Banking 
 
PKIB   Defending the right one   ‘Easy and comfortable access to public 
services’ and ‘prospering the 
        People’ programs 
                                               
34
 M  Edy Susilo  and Prayudi, “Signifikansi Iklan Politik dalam Pemilu 2004 (Analisis SemiotikaIklan PDI 
Perjuangan Dalam Kampanye Pemilu 2004” (“The Significance of Political Advertisment in the 2004 Elections: 
A semiotic Analysis  on PDI-P Advertisement in the 2004 Elections”) Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi 2:2 (2004): 250-
263. 
35
 Kompas, 15 March 2009. 
36Firmanzah, Persaingan, Legitimasi Kekuasaan, dan Marketing Politik, (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor 
Indonesia, 2010). 
37
 J. Lee-Marshment, Political Marketing Principles and Application, (London and New York: Taylor & 
Francis Group Routledge, 2009). 
38
 Firmanzah, Persaingan, Legitimasi Kekuasaan, dan Marketing Politik. 
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GERINDRA  Towards a Better Change   Ekonomikerakyatan, fighting against 
         poverty, accenting small scale business, 
        Independence for the energy sector, 
education and health 
 
HANURA  People’s Conscience   The Economic Reform, cheap but good 
education 
 
The table indicates that the nine winning parties employed similar themes in their campaigns. All of these were 
about how to reduce poverty and increase the prosperity of the same sectors: the economic, social, educative, 
and political. A similar construction of the Indonesian economic system under the banner of ekonomi 
kerakyatan was employed by both Nationalist and Islamist strands in their platforms.39 It stemmed from the state 
ideology, Pancasila, which was perceived to reflect the national identity.  
 
Pancasila, which had been imposed by Soeharto as the sole ideology, is the ideological umbrella that neither 
negates nor fuses the ideological differences of the Islamist versus Nationalist polarisation. It provides a shelter 
under the motto of Bhineka Tunggal Ika or Unity in Diversity. The notion implies an ideological mosaic which 
not only illuminates the difference/similarity within the concept of nation-state, but also indicates that Pancasila 
ideologically regulates the party’s and the candidate’s politics of image. It constitutes the model of democracy 
which synthesised musyawarah (deliberation), mufakat (consensus), gotong royong (mutual assistance/sharing 
burden), and kekeluargaan (family principle/family-ness), kebersamaan (collectivism), and kerukunan (social 
harmony) as the national wisdom. 
 
BILLBOARDS AS CULTURAL AND VISUAL ARTEFACTS 
 
Examining the visual operation and meaning making on the candidate’s billboard, we need to shift our focus 
from analysing the Indonesia’s legislative candidate billboards to the analysis of the legislative candidates’ 
billboards as the visual artefacts which represent Indonesia’s political realm. As outdoor political 
advertisements, Gudis asserts the logic of the candidates’ billboards operates like the mechanism of mobile 
market or the “buyway”.40 Not only does the billboard trespass the political boundaries of provinces, 
municipalities and villages, but it also allows the spectators to conduct ‘self-analyses’ towards so-called ‘street-
level museum art paintings’.41 However, due to the rapid mobility of the spectators in the public space, the 
billboards merely hold a temporary psychological status in the spectators’ minds that distract their attention. 
Furthermore, as a self-content narrative, candidates’ billboards visually communicate the messages quickly and 
silently. Their ubiquity, especially beside the roads during the election days, becomes a marker of habituation as 
people pass the billboards at all times. This (un)consciously forges a certain impression in the spectators which, 
according to Harrington, does not require any ‘intellectual attention’.42 It also reinforces the argument that 
Indonesian politics is more symbolic in nature than substantive.43 The use of symbolic attributes defines the 
scope the candidates express as well as represent their ‘personal’ (read: the parties’) ideology and shows the 
complexity of the polarisation. This, as Barthes argues, needs an optimum reading as the system of 
representation of the candidates’ image operates within the limitation of meaning.44 Thus, when the candidate 
constructs a certain image via the billboard, s/he confines her/himself to the sign system the image espouses. 
 
Reading a candidate’s billboard entails reading the narrative of its visuality. It is about an arrangement of signs 
as a ‘unit/narrative’ to codify the knowledge of sight to power through a semiotic reading practice which results 
from the relation between the candidate’s disposition (habitus) and position in a field (capital) within the 2009 
assembly election as the political arena.45 Barthes implicitly recognised that the practices of looking espouse the 
habitus’ construction, especially at the moment of transmitting the social meaning through the candidate’s 
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 The system which orients to empower people to open and manage small-sized enterprises so that later 
people’s independency towards the government can be reduced. 
40
 Catherine Gudis, Buyways Billboards, Automobiles, and the American Landscape (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2004). 
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 Ibid., 50-58. 
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 In Gudis, Buyways, 70. 
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 Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia.   
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 Roland Barthes, Image Music Text, Stephen Heath (trans.) (New York: The Noonday Press, 1977), 33. 
45
 Roland Barthes, Image Music Text; Michel Foucault, “Panopticism,” in Visual Culture: the Reader, J. Evans 
and S. Hall (Eds.) (London: Sage, 1999), 61-71. 
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photograph on the billboard.46  Barthes continues that the photograph is ‘the ellipse of language, a condensation 
of the social whole, for it suggests not merely physical fetishism, a way of dressing, a set of daily choices, a 
posture, the social setting but more saliently the glorification of the photogenic,’47 which is capable of inviting 
the voter’s habitus to perceive the candidate’s veritable physical transference as the act of delegating 
herself/himself to reflect plausibly voters’ aspirations.  
 
Besides representing the candidates’/ parties’ ideology, the billboard also narrates how the candidates position 
themselves in the factional polarisation which is possibly different from the ideological position the parties take 
in the polarisation within demokrasi Pancasila. The analysis focuses on the mechanism of the symbolic 
exchange on the billboard that portrays the candidates’ political positioning in their politics of image. 
 
READING VISUAL NARRATIVES 
 
A. NATIONALIST PARTIES: 
 
PartaiDemokrat (Democratic Party or PD) 
Munadi Herlambang, the Secretary of Youth and Sport Department of Democratic party, employed the slogan: 
‘Young, Objective, Without Prejudice’ to illuminate his personal qualities. He provides the procedures to vote 
for him, his number on the ballot paper, the tick sign, his mobile number for sending SMS and his personal 
website. The inclusion of the mobile number and website signifies open access for the public to reach 
Herlambang and connotes his quality as an open-minded person that can cope with input and critics. The voting 
procedure occupies almost half of Herlambang’s billboard which is positioned centrally. It indicates that he 
wants to remind the viewers about the new voting procedure.48 However at the same time, it represents his 
agitation for his electability.  
 
He correlates his image with SBY’s (the current president and the key party’s figure) image, the national flag 
and the party’s logo so that the public perceives him as the representative of the nationalist figure by juxtaposing 
his image with SBY’s which appears on the left hand corner. As the reading pattern begins from the left to the 
right, it makes the spectators focus on SBY’s image first and later relates it with Herlambang’s. This 
dependence on SBY’s image implies Herlambang’s lack of personal recognisability. As Ajidarma would argue, 
Herlambang’s dependence on SBY’s image is communally accepted,49 for in the paternalistic culture (as 
represented in Pancasila) such a notion is allowed to reinforce the transmission of SBY’s charisma/sensuality as 
the paternalistic party’s figure to Herlambang.50 He chose SBY’s image in which he lifted his right hand as if to 
give an order which demonstrates a visual tactic and Herlambang’s disposition towards SBY’s military style of 
command. The action verbs he deploys (choose, open, find and tick) in the procedure reinforce the transferring 
attempt of SBY’s style of command.  
 
Herlambang’s visual tactic also implies the utilisation of SBY’s image as a Javanese ‘gentle’ patron. SBY’s self-
representation of his disposition to power intimates his adoption of ‘the Javanese normative behavioural form of 
halus (refinement)’ or virtues,51 such as ‘patience, detachment, resignation and respect.’52 In this sense, not 
merely does the deployment of SBY’s corporeal body on Herlambang’s billboard connote the patron’s charisma, 
but also signifies the metaphor which indicates the modus operandi of correlating Herlambang’s image with 
SBY’s Javanese ‘soft’ power. At the same time, the utilisation of SBY’s body as visual capital can be seen as 
twofold: it implies the submissive code especially when Herlambang visually defines his disposition through 
SBY. Secondly, the condition can be reversed. Herlambang’s passivity cannot be seen as representing a 
submissive action per se. If he wins the ticket to the parliament, he will, without exception, support SBY’s 
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administration. This creates mutual dependency between SBY and Herlambang on the visual level. By this, the 
symbolic mutual exchange occurs. 
 
Beside his reliance on SBY to represent his nationalist characteristics, the party jacket Herlambang wears also 
signifies his nationalist orientation. The jacket becomes the code that represents the party’s nationalist-religious 
characteristic as stated in its statutes. As the party’s logo is crafted on the jacket, it bears the party’s logo (the 
red and white three pointed star), which symbolises the party’s religiosity and nationalist orientation (the red and 
white colours are associated with the Indonesian national flag that connotes the nationalist spirit especially 
during  Independence).53  His nationalist image is amplified by the accentuation of Herlambang’s academic titles 
(S.T. and M.A.) which not only illuminates his academic qualities but also indicates the cultural capital he has. 
This denotes his academic capabilities in handling the technological (S.T. denotes a bachelor degree in 
engineering) and social/humanities issues (M. A. connotes his academic quality of handling the 
social/humanities issues). However, the signs that illustrate PD’s slogan (continue!) and platform (reducing 
poverty and country’s debt) are absent. He failed in his candidacy. 
 
Partai Golkar  
In his billboard, Priyo Budi Santoso, the deputy chairperson of the Parliament from Golkar and the chairperson 
of Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia or ICMI, promises to build synergy to unite the ummat by employing 
four cartoon characters which arrange four puzzles to build a circle. His preference for deploying the cartoon 
characters to describe the slogan instead of an authentic (non-cartoon character) one possibly attenuates the 
visual credibility, because albeit the characters represent the neutral symbols of the Islamic community, they 
merely possess a faint correlation with the ummat itself. The human hands arranging the puzzle as the image 
background signify that the effort to build synergy is controlled so that musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat 
(consensus) to unite the ummat (to reach kerukunan or social harmony) are achieved within the framework of 
Golkar. This also suggests Golkar’s nationalist notion of mufakat that reinforces the pattern of kawula-gusti in 
Pancasila. Kingsbury argues that mufakat is not synonymous with ‘the open airing of differences of opinion,’ but 
rather implies the subservience of social norms guided by gusti as the patron.54 In this sense, O’Sullivan et al. 
view that the functional notion as reflected in Golkar’s name (Golongan Karya or Functional Group), operates 
by smoothing over conflict as gusti functions to maintain the party’s equilibrium and ensure the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the party’s constituent parts.55 Maintaining the effectiveness and efficiency is conducted by 
performing practical actions that represent the party’s cohesion (read: equilibrium) as reflected in its logo. 
Golkar’s logo, the banyan tree and the adjoined rice and cotton, represent the Pancasila principles: the unity of 
Indonesia and democracy through deliberation and consensus. At this stage, the logo signifies the party’s dual 
system: sustaining an equilibrium through practical actions whilst positioning the practicality as the modus 
operandi. Thus, the notion ‘functionalism,’ which highly regards the functionality of each division in the party, 
has been shifted into pragmatic actions as deploying the ‘functional’ notion arguably positions Golkar as a 
‘catch-all’ party.  
 
Golkar’s position as the ‘catch-all’ party opens the opportunity for its legislative candidates to adopt any 
ideological values as long as it resonates with the party’s vision and mission. As the representative of the ‘catch-
all’party and one of ICMI chairpersons, Santoso’s billboard deploys Islamic symbolic attributes in the form of 
the noun ‘ummat’, Islamic attire (baju koko and Peci), and his socio-political roles in Islamic society. The 
deployment of the noun - ummat - in his slogan accentuates Santoso’s political disposition towards the Islamist 
voters.56 It is very important for Islam to build synergy within the nationalist framework of Golkar. This 
politicking is reinforced by his appearance in wearing the white baju koko (the Muslim male shirt which is 
usually worn to go to the mosque) and a black peci (a male Muslim cap). Peci used to be perceived as one of the 
pieces of attires for the Muslim man to wear whilst praying. It has now become one of the pieces of national 
attires to be worn in state ceremonies, which according to Ajidarma, reflects his socio-moral status.57 Below his 
smiling image are Santoso’s identity labels which indicates his social capital (the pioneer of T. P. A. or the 
educational spot for children to study Al Qur’an; the counsellor of BKPRMI or the Indonesian Mosque Youth 
Communication Board; Chairperson of ICMI) to ostensibly convince the Islamist nationalist electorates to vote 
him. At the right bottom, he invites the spectators to vote for him on election day for he represents the one who 
cares for the mosque, the Muslim children, Pesantren and struggles for the ummat aspiration. The invitation 
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signifies taking the position of developing Indonesian Islam. This politicking also demonstrates the obscurity of 
polarisation between the Nationalist and Islamist strands. Representing the Nationalist party, Santoso cannot 
dissociate himself from his Islamic credentials. Joining Golkar, a nationalist party that is strong institutionally, is 
arguably seen as a smart way to catch all the Muslim voters (santri and abangan).58 With the cultural capital to 
catch the santri voters in his hand, Santoso can easily captivate the abangan Muslim voters as he represents the 
whole package of Islamic images with Golkar as his electoral machine. 
 
Santoso also provides the ballot paper dummy and the tick sign on his number on the right bottom hand corner. 
The one eighth portion of the dummy in Santoso’s billboard indicates not the insignificance of the new system 
to be disseminated but demonstrates his self-assurance in his electability for he was known as the most popular 
parliament member in 2004-2009. Santoso succeeded in his candidacy. 
 
PDI-P 
Djarot Saiful was the former mayor of Blitar and the legislative candidate from PDI-P. His image presenting a 
basket of star fruit to an old peasant woman represents his slogan: the leader’s task is to enrich the people, not to 
make them suffer. By presenting this pictorial act to the spectators, Saiful promotes himself not merely as the 
legislative candidate who is concerned with people’s prosperity, but also perpetuates his image as the one who 
successfully developed the star fruit business of the local people from Blitar. The scene resonates with the 
party’s slogan - the grassroots’ party –for it demonstrates the philanthropic act of helping the poor people and 
visually materializes PDI-P’s platform, ‘prospering the people.’ However, the act also signifies the hierarchical 
power relation between Saiful as the former mayor with the commoner and the woman. Instead of picking the 
fruit together, his act in handing the fruit as a gift connotes the Javanese priyayi paternalistic action in which 
gusti helps to prosper kawula, which plausibly embodies the Pancasila’s fourth democratic principle (‘popular 
sovereignty arrived at through deliberation and representation’). The scene occupies half of the billboard to 
accentuate that Saiful represents the PDI-P’s democratic spirit by deploying the similar symbol of the fourth 
principle of Pancasila, the buffalo’s head.  
 
The inclusion of the title hajj in Djarot Saiful’s image signifies his political disposition towards Islam. Although 
Saiful’s Islamic nuance does not present as being as conspicuous as Santoso’s, Saiful’s title indicates his identity 
as a Muslim who belongs to the so-called secular nationalist party. The title hajj in Indonesia is seen as 
representing one’s social and/or religious status due to the cost involved in a visit to Mecca. Saiful’s use of the 
title connects to the populist perception that when one attaches the title “hajj” in front of one’s name (after 
conducting  a pilgrimage) one is perceived as a pious Muslim, although widespread exploitation of the practice 
for socio/religious-political purposes arguably means that it is perceived as an indication of social status rather 
than degree of piety. Like Santoso, Saiful does not include PDI-P’s key political figure in his billboard 
(Megawati Soekarnoputri), for both are aware of their popularity in the national level (for Santosa) or the 
regional level (for Saiful). As the former successful mayor of Blitar, Saiful believes that his image and 
philanthropic activities sufficiently represents the party’s platforms as the “wongcilik” or grassroots’ party. 
Saiful failed to enter Parliament.  
 
Gerindra 
Haryo Seno was the legislative candidate from Gerindra representing Ngawi, Magetan, Ponorogo and 
Trenggalek constituencies. He deployed the same pattern as Herlambang in presenting himself to the public with 
the absence of an authentic visual setting of place to support the party’s/Seno’s ‘distinctive’ ideology. Seno 
employed the Gerindra slogan: ‘Let us build together.’ However, no signs support this slogan except for the 
lifting fist of Prabowo Subianto, the party’s key figure, and a retired military General, which faintly indicates 
the nationalist spirit to build the country with Gerindra/Haryo Seno. His deployment of the same slogan as the 
party’s indicates the absence of his ‘distinctive’ platform. He merely illuminates that change can be established 
within the framework of Gerindra which employed Garuda, the national emblem to illuminate Pancasila. 
Gerindra uses the upper part of the bird, the neck and the head, to ostensibly represent the holistic notion of 
nationalist identity. The inviting word ’mari’ or ‘let us’ fails to arouse the spirit to build the country because the 
invitation sounds plain with the absence of supporting visual signs. It appears parallel to Subiato’s image which 
indicates the existence of vertical communication of the party’s key figure with the public. The message loses its 
meaning as the medium shot of Seno occupies almost half of the billboard to introduce himself without 
attempting to disseminate his personal program within the framework of the party’s platforms. The billboard 
merely introduces Seno as the newcomer in the (local) political arena. Like Herlambang, Seno correlates his 
image with the party’s key figure along with the national flag as the background colours (red and white). 
Subianto’s image appears in the right hand corner while Seno’s image lies under Subianto’s but dominates the 
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billboard. Juxtaposing his image with Subianto’s merely shows his lack of personal reputation as a politician 
and indicates that Seno is trapped in the dominant paternalistic discourse. Like most candidates, Seno provides 
the ballot paper dummy with the tick sign on his number to remind the voters of the new election system. He 
failed to enter the House of Representatives in Senayan. 
 
Hanura 
Dosy Iskandar Prasetyo’s billboard adopts a similar tactic in his politics of image to Haryo Seno. From the left 
hand side, we can see that the smiling image of Wiranto, the retired General who was the former commander of 
the Armed Forces in Soeharto’s era. Wiranto’s military standing reinforces the party’s claim of support from the 
military camp, but the retired General’s smile relaxes the potentially domineering image of the party/candidate. 
Prasetyo also appears smiling towards the camera. These smiles connote a friendliness that softens the strong-
willed slogan (it is the time for our conscience to speak).The party’s logo (an arrow),59 which signifies a linear 
thinking structure, is positioned next to Wiranto’s image. The logo appears to be flowing and connotes the 
waving horizontal pattern to indicate the party’s target progress movement, i.e. to bring the conscience to the 
right/true/correct progress of the nation, under one command/leadership. Like any other candidate, Prasetyo also 
includes the ballot paper dummy below Wiranto’s image as the indirect way to remind the spectators when they 
cast the vote. The title hajj in Prasetyo’s name is deployed as the tactic to demonstrate his religious (Islamist) 
nationalist identity. Although he failed in his candidacy, he succeeded in becoming the Secretary General of 
Hanura. 
 
B. ISLAMIST PARTIES: 
 
PKS 
The billboard of Hidayat Nur Wahid (the former chairperson of People’s Consultative Assembly in 2004-2009 
and the Legislative member from PKS) cannot be directly perceived as his medium to promote himself as the 
legislative candidate. However, it appeared during the campaign days. Unlike other figures, Wahid does not face 
the camera in his billboard image, but is shown from a slanting angle in the seemingly altruistic action of 
helping flood victims. This para-language suggests the focus of Wahid’s billboard is not on introducing who 
Hidayat Nur Wahid is, but rather demonstrating what he has done. He is seen looking at a group of men helping 
the flood victims and giving his thumb-up to them, while sitting on a rescue boat holding an oar. While the 
scene signifies Wahid’s attempt to encourage the volunteers who were helping the flood victims, it also affirms 
the hierarchical power relation between him as the gusti (the party’s elite) and the group of men as the kawula. 
The volunteer activities signify the nationalist spirit of gotong royong (mutual assistance/sharing burden) of this 
Islamist party. Wahid’s presence seems more like an inspection of PKS’s cadres voluntary works. His billboard 
imitates the cigarette ad for ’Gudang Garam International,’ the survivor version. He altered the cigarette’s 
slogan ‘Pria Punya Selera’ (The Man Got the Taste) into ‘Rakyat Punya Selera’ (The People Got the Taste). He 
juxtaposes the ‘people’ with the ‘man.’ The male figures/characters dominate the billboard. Women are absent 
from the conspicuous voluntary visual scene which occupies almost half of the billboard. One female figure 
appears solely and covertly as a student wearing a white headscarf in the imperceptible background of the 
slogan which shows Wahid as gusti surrounded by kawula when visiting the location. Wahid’s humanitarian 
action affirms the constructed segregation of the social, cultural and political roles of males/females and 
Gusti/Kawula in patriarchal Indonesian society. The product logo and name ‘Gudang Garam Internasional’ is 
altered into the logo and the name of the party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party). In the 
middle bottom of the billboard lies the party’s slogan: Clean, Caring, Professional used to illuminate the 
qualities of PKS’s cadres. The typical government warning attached at the bottom of the billboard for cigarette 
advertisements is altered into the people’s warning: choosing PKS will result in the prosperity of the people, the 
progressive development of the country, the annihilation of corruption and increasing pride in the nation and 
state. The word ‘warning’ which connotes negative attributes is transformed into the positive one as Wahid 
transforms it as the medium to promulgate the party’s mission, i.e. clean governance. He succeeded in his 
candidacy. 
 
PAN 
Ahmad Firdaus was the former legislative member in the provincial government of Banten (1999-2003). He was 
also known as a former TKI, an Indonesian worker, in Saudi Arabia. Dissatisfied with his income, he joined an 
NGO which later brought him in as the chairperson of PAN in Banten. In his billboard Firdaus transformed 
himself into a James Bond figure (wearing a black tuxedo and holding a gun), declaring war on corruption, 
stupidity and poverty. The association is partly due to Firdaus’ number on the ballot paper (no. 7) which 
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resonates with 007, but also reflects his interest in how the C. I. A. and M. I. 6,  allegedly intervened in the 
G30S PKI incident which (in)directly toppled Soekarno’s administration, underlining his goals of political and 
economic freedom. However, Bond simply represents the imperialist character who seemingly upholds the law 
and justice from occidental perspectives. It indicates his alignment with imperialist manoeuvres to fight against 
so-called injustice. Firdaus also includes a series of images of Soetrisno Bachir’s (the former chairperson of 
PAN) and his political activities. As an Islamic theology graduate, he includes one of Al Qur’an verses, Al 
Kahfi 107, under his name. He capitalized the words ‘sesungguhnya’ or the truth, ‘beriman’ and 
‘beramalsholeh’ or ‘faithful, pious and do good works according to Islamic values’ and ‘Firdaus’ (his name 
which means heaven). Associating himself with James Bond and the Al Qur’an verses not only affirms his 
obscure, yet fluid identity, but also demonstrates that pastiche is Firdaus’ tactic, which unfortunately dilutes the 
visual credibility of his image as PAN cadre.60 Firdaus failed in his candidacy. 
 
PPP 
Marissa Haque was the former legislative member of PDI-P in Megawati’s era. In the 2009 Assembly election 
she chose to stand as the PPP candidate. She translated the party’s platform (‘education and public health 
services for free’) into her distinctive platform, ‘prioritize early childhood education,’ which also becomes 
Haque’s slogan on the billboard. Rather than focusing on her objectives, however, the billboard seems focused 
on introducing Haque to the public, merely presenting a medium shot of her smiling profile and the ballot paper 
dummy as the visual text. This strategy suggests that while it was believed that she possessed sufficient social 
and cultural capital to render introduction of her political and personal credentials unnecessary, it was felt 
necessary to introduce her as a new identity to detach the nationalist/secular label by which the public knew her 
as the former legislative member of PDI-P. Haque’s statement on her website reinforces the religious 
considerations underpinning her shift to the PPP, which she regards as the answer to her prayers after fasting for 
40 days prior to her decision when seven parties proposed to her that she become their candidate.61 To resonate 
with the Islamic nuances of the party, she wears a green headscarf, includes her hajj title and faces the camera 
from a slanting angle, smiling. This tactic is necessary to reinforce her Islamic public womanhood image, 
although the inclusion of the title hajj in Haque’s billboard indicates a similar tactic of symbolic religious 
reinforcement found among candidates regardless of gender. Like other candidates who socialise the new voting 
rule in their billboards, Haque provides the ballot paper dummy which is placed on the right hand side of the 
billboard and accentuates her name and number on the ballot paper with the tick sign beneath her image. 
Although larger font and the position of the slogan indicate Haque’s emphasis on the early childhood education, 
this accenting loses its credibility because Haque does not provide any (authentic) visual attributes to support 
her claimed priority. Haque failed to penetrate the Parliament.  
 
PKB 
H. Sholeh Hayat is the current legislative member at the provincial level (East Java) under the law and 
governance commission. He represents PKB and emphasises the green-ness and calmness of Surabaya (the 
capital city of East Java province) as his slogan. From the left hand side, the logo of PKB appears of little 
significance since it merely occupies less than one eighth of the billboard. The billboard focuses on Hayat’s 
smiling close-up profile image. He puts his campaign slogan on the top using a smaller font than his name 
which indicates that Hayat accentuates his persona rather than his program. His slogan does not resonate with 
his role in Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the biggest Muslim organization in Indonesia with (East) Java as its main 
base, or as the co-ordinator of law and Rukyah Hilal. Possibly the green-ness and calmness of Surabaya as the 
slogan was chosen because they matched PKB’s Islamist green colour. The relating verb ‘songson’ or 
‘welcome’ indicates the informative (rather than persuading) statement that the public will have or welcome the 
green-ess and calmness of Surabaya by his coming to the House of Representatives at the provincial level. The 
indirect statement also represents Hayat’s diffident tactic in communicating his program.  He labels his role in 
NU with the word ‘identity.’ Like most legislative candidates, Hayat puts his name and the identification label 
as the legislative candidate under his profile image. Albeit Hayat’s billboard does not provide the authentic 
visual setting of place to support his distinctive platform, Hayat gains sufficient social and cultural capital as 
NU’s public figure at the provincial level. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
History records that the contestation between the Nationalist and Islamist strands began during the 
determination of the state ideology, Pancasila. The removal of the Islamic seven words (‘dengan kewajiban 
menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya’ or ’with the obligation to live according to Islamic law for the 
Muslims’) in the first principle of Pancasila in 1945 positioned the ideology as an inclusive yet ambiguous 
political doctrine. Soeharto’s policy of coercing Pancasila as the sole ideology of the political parties contributed 
to attenuate the contestation. When Soeharto was impeached, the contestation re-emerged in a form dissimilar to 
that experienced from 1945 through the 1960s. The polarisation appeared especially when the Islamist strand 
forged a central axis to impede Megawati becoming the President. However, this overt contestation dilutes as 
the parties now adopt the cartel system. 
 
This historical fact foregrounds the obscurity of the parties’ identity. This can be seen from the candidates’ 
billboards that represent the ambiguous position of Islamist and Nationalist parties. The candidates cannot 
represent themselves as the nationalist or Islamist figure per se to capture the Islamist and Nationalist voters, but 
can flexibly adopt the Islamist and Nationalist notions as the symbolic exchange within the framework of 
demokrasi Pancasila. The billboards also show the (in)consistency of the candidates to resonate with the party’s 
platforms and slogans, which is possibly due to the  contestation in the politics of image between 
Islamist/Nationalist camps that obscures the candidates’ ideological orientation. The Islamist and Nationalist 
attributes on the billboard fail to construct an identity myth in their political branding. 
 
The billboards of the nationalist camp demonstrate that Pancasila as the nationalist ideology is frequently 
presented along with the parties patrons’ images, which in themselves can be interpreted as representing the 
nationalist notion of Pancasila. However, we cannot assume that the absence of the patron’s image dilutes the 
nationalist values propagated by the candidates’ billboards, since, as in Golkar’s case, this absence most 
probably stems from the absence of the parties’ central figures. The candidates also utilise the image of the 
party’s key figure especially when they lack popularity or public recognition themselves. 
 
Similar to the nationalist faction, the billboards of the Islamist parties also represent the obscurity of the 
ideological polarisation. Although the billboards are heavily loaded with the use of Islamic symbolic attributes 
such as the headscarf,  peci, baju koko and the citation of Qur’anic verses (as part of the candidates’ para-
language), the ways in which the candidates deliver the message of their programs seem not to overtly connote 
an Islamic way. The dress code of Ahmad Firdaus and Hidayat Nur Wahid do not represent their religiosity. 
Firdaus transforms himself into an Indonesian James Bond whilst Wahid casually wears a batik shirt, black 
trousers and a white cap. Presenting himself wearing batik, the world heritage cloth of Indonesia, shows an 
attempt by Wahid to invoke the nationalist strand, instead of the Islamic one.  
 
The image construction of the Nationalist and Islamist parties operates ambiguously. They both seem to adopt 
similar ideological values as they realise that capturing Indonesian voters is as difficult as dividing santri and 
abangan. Although Indonesia is known as having the biggest Muslim population of any country in the world, 
the Islamic characteristic of the dominant Muslim group (abangan) does not allow the polarisation to operate as 
two distinctive poles as if absenting the ideological overlap between these two camps. In this overlap, the 
ideological contestation occurs which leads to the ambiguous position of the parties and the candidates’ 
branding. 
 
